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Abstract
Background: Respiratory alarm monitoring and rapid response team alerts on hospital general floors are based on
detection of simple numeric threshold breaches. Although some uncontrolled observation trials in select patient
populations have been encouraging, randomized controlled trials suggest that this simplistic approach may not
reduce the unexpected death rate in this complex environment. The purpose of this review is to examine the
history and scientific basis for threshold alarms and to compare thresholds with the actual pathophysiologic
patterns of evolving death which must be timely detected.
Methods: The Pubmed database was searched for articles relating to methods for triggering rapid response teams
and respiratory alarms and these were contrasted with the fundamental timed pathophysiologic patterns of death
which evolve due to sepsis, congestive heart failure, pulmonary embolism, hypoventilation, narcotic overdose, and
sleep apnea.
Results: In contrast to the simplicity of the numeric threshold breach method of generating alerts, the actual
patterns of evolving death are complex and do not share common features until near death. On hospital general
floors, unexpected clinical instability leading to death often progresses along three distinct patterns which can be
designated as Types I, II and III. Type I is a pattern comprised of hyperventilation compensated respiratory failure
typical of congestive heart failure and sepsis. Here, early hyperventilation and respiratory alkalosis can conceal the
onset of instability. Type II is the pattern of classic CO2 narcosis. Type III occurs only during sleep and is a pattern
of ventilation and SPO2 cycling caused by instability of ventilation and/or upper airway control followed by
precipitous and fatal oxygen desaturation if arousal failure is induced by narcotics and/or sedation.
Conclusion: The traditional threshold breach method of detecting instability on hospital wards was not
scientifically derived; explaining the failure of threshold based monitoring and rapid response team activation in
randomized trials. Furthermore, the thresholds themselves are arbitrary and capricious. There are three common
fundamental pathophysiologic patterns of unexpected hospital death. These patterns are too complex for early
detection by any unifying numeric threshold. New methods and technologies which detect and identify the actual
patterns of evolving death should be investigated.
Background
Unexpected deaths in hospitals and the complications
leading to them often include some form of respiratory
failure. The macro and micro system dysfunctions
responsible for these unexpected respiratory instabilities
have been extensively studied, but there still remains
considerable misunderstanding among general care clini-
cians as to how this all works. Much of the confusion is
explained by the beleaguered clinician’s susceptibility
(aka affinity) for conventional wisdom that promises to
reliably simplify or “reduce” the complexity and work so
often defining the clinical conditions of their hospitalized
patients. Easily tracked physiologic bio-markers with
warnings when certain “limits” are breached, e.g. breach-
ing of specific heart rate or respiratory rate thresholds,
have for years been thought to reflect the onset of serious
clinical instabilities. Alarms on our monitors and the
monitors themselves become ever more cosmetically
impressive, but still function by warning us of these basic
breaches, which in theory should be good for patients if
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when it can be most effectively treated. Unfortunately,
this isn’t the case. Recent examination shows our “reduc-
tionist” monitoring methods to be substantially over-
simplified, capable of reliably detecting clinical instability
only much later in its devolution. As a result, stake-
holders invested in the status quo are now starting to
argue, “Better late than never.” This sort of rationale may
at first sound reasonable, but thorough analysis should
convince you otherwise, exposing it as glib, self serving
and seriously flawed by its cost to us all in terms of
patient morbidity, mortality, and squandered resources.
The late detections being signaled by our monitors are
often associated with antecedent false senses of security
that actually further delay recognition and rescue other-
wise likely to occur through astute and timely clinical
observation. Without the monitor, decisions to call for
help might well have been made based on clinical signs
and symptoms, but these are frequently discounted now
because of the reassurance provided by our monitors’
silence.
In cases of unexpected onset of respiratory trouble,
current detection methods are often ineffective, yet
nevertheless have been tenured because of their ease
and tradition of use with little modification guided by
scientific fact or value measured through patient
outcomes. One example (we’ll discuss later in detail)
making this point is the 90% SPO2 threshold from the
pulse oximeter. Many general care clinicians still behave
as if this number has magical properties capable of pre-
cisely differentiating respiratory stability from failure.
Over-simplified concepts like this can be very seductive
to harried clinicians inclined to believe in them. Unfor-
tunately, as we soon shall see, any reassurance conveyed
by SPO2 values over 90% is often as false as the clini-
cians’ misplaced beliefs.
We will review in detail three very distinct and irredu-
cible clinical paths that make up the majority of unex-
pected respiratory problems seen in hospitals today.
Unless caught early, these paths commonly progress to
critical instability and death, with each path so physiolo-
gically unique they don’t begin sharing any patterns
until terminal. What this means regarding the possibility
of early detection is that no single threshold bio-marker
breach today can identify any of these paths’ patterns
reasonably near their onsets, but rather only much later
if at all. That’s bad news for the threshold industry and
all of us depending on it, but there is good news.
Sequential clinical patterns defining our three instability
paths leave behind uniquely distinct “footprints” in real-
time. These footprints are built from bio-marker signal
composites based on the actual relational (conforma-
tional) patterns these bio-markers leave from their
changes over time. We will be discussing new alarm
processing methods for capturing and recognizing these
actual relational patho-physiologic patterns once we’ve
reviewed in depth the inherent weaknesses of our pre-
sent monitoring paradigm and how it is we’ve come to
this critical juncture in providing patient safety.
Some of the problem has been that reliable information
on these unique pattern architectures was until now
sequestered to a great extent in niche sub-specialties like
sleep medicine. It isn’t unusual in healthcare to discover
much later important clinical information effectively con-
cealed from the front-line hospital caregiver having to
most often deal with its potential co-morbid associations.
This front-line lack of understanding is reflected in the
unquestioned way we’ve chosen to monitor our general
care patients, and even more by many of our standard-
o f - c a r ep r o c e s s e sw h e nf r a m e di nac o m m o ns e n s e
context of early recognition being the most essential
component to successfully reversing any clinical dete-
rioration. Just look at our current management protocols
on sepsis. Because sepsis is known to be so lethal, most
hospitals today have designated protocol-explicit physio-
l o g i cc r i t e r i at h a to n c ei d e n t i f i e d ,t r i g g e ra l a r m sf o r
immediate rescue deployment. One such criterion is
reached when a patient’s respiratory rate breaches a
threshold set typically at 30 per minute. Yet the definition
of sepsis established in 1992 by the American College of
Chest Physicians and Society of Critical Care Medicine
includes any respiratory rate greater than 20 per minute.
Every competent clinician appreciates the deadliness of
sepsis and the importance of recognizing it early for a
successful resuscitation. This has been called the golden
period; when missed, mortality and hospital cost rise dra-
matically. So how can we argue logically for extending
our threshold alarms out past 30 breaths per minute
when its defining criterion is so significantly less? Why
would clinicians allow such delays in calling for help,
knowing their patients’ lives depend on early, aggressive
therapeutic intervention?
We hope you’ll find the following discussion interesting
and informative. We expect as well that you may find
much of what we have to say provocative, given that we
challenge many deeply entrenched cultural beliefs under-
pinning our hospital general care as it’s currently being
practiced. For this we don’t apologize. Anyone familiar
with the day-to-day inner workings of our hospitals
knows them to be far from perfect despite the best inten-
tions of many bright, highly skilled clinicians that include
our nurses, physicians, and ancillary care providers. This
discussion is designed to be straight forward and trans-
parent with its claims well referenced and appropriately
illustrated. For all it exposes as being less than optimal, it
offers reasonable fixes. Patients deserve what they’ve in
the past taken for granted, optimal management of unex-
pected clinical change...in short, their safety. This can
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timely, competent response. Your advocacy for immedi-
ate change being made in our traditional beliefs and
choices regarding recognition/response strategy is the
only way to assure this safety going forward.
Methods
The Pubmed database between 1956 and December 15,
2010 was searched for articles relating to methods for
triggering rapid response teams and respiratory alarms
on hospital wards and for articles pertaining to the fun-
damental physiologic mechanisms and pathophysiologic
patterns of death which evolve due to sepsis, congestive
heart failure, pulmonary embolism, hypoventilation, nar-
cotic overdose, and sleep apnea.
Results
Overview of Patient Monitoring on the Hospital General
Floor
Traditional monitoring on hospital general care floors is
based on a 16
th century “fire alarm” model where an
alarm, such as a bell, begins to sound when a dangerous
fire has been detected. In modern hospitals, sets of
physiologic parameters (bio-markers) are sampled from
patients either continuously or intermittently in order to
monitor their clinical conditions for the occurrence of
change regarded as dangerous, more specifically any
change that coincides with selected threshold breaches
thought to represent the onset of clinical instability, i.e.
the fire. When these threshold breaches occur, a loud
noise may sound or some other signal gets communi-
cated immediately to indicate the onset of this urgency
and that help is needed. The actual threshold values
being used today are somewhat arbitrary, but generally
fall within predictable ranges, e.g. SPO2 of 90-80%,
respiratory rates of 30-36/min, or heart rates of
120-140/min [1]. Table 1 presents a various thresholds
commonly applied [2].
Once alarms are triggered, most hospitals today have
organizational rescue processes in place to deal with
them. These commonly involve some variation on a
rapid response team (RRT) activation that behaves like a
“fire brigade” coming to the rescue of the patient in
trouble [3,4]. While this fire alarm and brigade model
has been accepted in theory as being a straight forward,
reliable way to ensure patient safety [3-5], more recent
studies [6,7] and a recent meta-analysis [8] suggest that
using these thresholds and rapid response activations
may not be nearly as effective as first thought. Assuming
this concern has merit, it raises some important ques-
tions. Is it the fire alarm (detection arm of the process),
the fire brigade (response and treatment arm of the pro-
cess), or both that are failing to improve outcomes from
these kinds of events [9]...and why?
While a lot has been written recently to suggest the
problem lies with our relatively new RRT efferent pro-
cesses (response and treatment arm), evidence can also
be found pointing to the fire alarm (detection arm) on
our hospital floors as being our weak link. Of the several
threshold monitoring applications currently available,
the capability and effectiveness of one in particular,
threshold based pulse oximetry, has proven to be dis-
appointing in several randomized controlled trials.
For example, a 2009 meta-analysis of 22,992 patients
studied in randomized trails over the past two decades
using threshold based pulse oximetry found no outcome
benefit [10]. Included in this review was the 2006 rando-
mized prospective trial [11] of so called “new genera-
tion” [12] motion resistant [13] pulse oximeters that
we’ll take a closer look at later in our discussion.
So what might be the source of the problem if any, and
why? Before we begin exploring this, it’s important to
review some basics. In hospitals today, patients can be
found in a variety of unstable states, either from the dis-
eases they have or from the controlled trauma (surgical
interventions) they’re recovering. In order to assure pro-
gressive healing or to best hedge against unanticipated
worsening of their clinical conditions, tests are generally
ordered in some predictable fashion commensurate with
our training to assess either the patients’ states of well-
being or to possibly expose early trouble and the need for
changes in treatment. These tests often yield quantitative
results expressed in numeric measurements that sit to
one side or the other of some threshold value we’ve
deemed as being a clinically reliable cutoff measurement
for whatever bio-marker we happen to be testing. For
example, any value equal to or higher than “X” (our
deemed threshold) indicates a positive test we can rely
on. Test results then confirm or rule out with a high
degree of certainty whatever suspicions led to the test
being ordered and quite possibly to an action or change
in therapy. Traditionally through considerable experi-
mental trial, the behavior of any test under development
is either validated or rejected based on its reliability.
Reliability is the degree of a particular test’s sensitivity
(TP/TP+FN) and specificity (TN/FP+TN), both com-
monly expressed in percentages, and both dependent on
a single threshold value selected to serve as the cutoff
between what has been designated to be positive and
negative (TP = True Positive, TN = True Negative, FP =
False Positive, FN = False Negative). Tests from bio-mar-
kers that aren’t capable of yielding single threshold values
that are both reasonably sensitive and specific simulta-
neously, either are abandoned or combined in series with
other tests, the amalgam of which must become reliable
in order to be useful.
Tests come in many types and any ongoing monitoring
of physiologic bio-markers like heart rate, respiratory
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with all the same rules applying. However, an important
difference does exist that unknowingly creates problems.
While these bio-marker samplings from patients can be
acquired quite easily, often being readily displayed on
monitors today in real-time, little has ever been done to
either validate their degrees of reliability or for that mat-
ter their capability to even be considered reliable. That
is to say, we’ve never ascertained if any of these bio-
markers are able to provide us with a threshold value
that is simultaneously sensitive and specific for detecting
the one thing most important to us: clinical instability in
its early evolution, i.e. reasonably close to its onset.
Nevertheless, we inherited and have “grandfathered” our
deemed physiologic bio-markers through tradition, routi-
nely monitoring for them without a second thought
given to these reliability/capability issues, and their
importance.
Likewise, the semantics surrounding threshold based
reliability is able to be manipulated in ways that can be
very misleading. A relatively contemporary example
making this point is the SPO2 bio-signal acquired by
standard threshold based pulse oximeters on general
care floors. When its “high” degrees of sensitivity and
specificity are being discussed, the praise refers to the
device itself and its accuracy for reliably alarming when
ap a t i e n t ’s SPO2 has breached a threshold value most
commonly set at 90% [2]. The advent of motion tolerant
filters and other technologic advances continues to
improve the precision of these devices, but all these
improvements unfortunately have become confused
(even by the FDA oximetry standards committee) with
improved “bio” reliability for the detection of what really
matters, early respiratory distress [14]. Yet no clinical
validation was ever done to establish this. It was selected
as little more than a metric friendly, arbitrary guess as
to what might possibly constitute a physiologic problem,
a choice providing a simplified threshold target for the
monitoring industry and the basis for impressive appear-
ing promotional material. However, as we will explain,
an occurrence (or lack of occurrence) of a threshold
breach at 90% SPO2 is largely meaningless in many clin-
ical settings, rendering these promoted sensitivities and
specificities equally meaningless.
Now let’s for a moment consider what happens when
we monitor patients in terms of our traditional “tests” for
respiratory instability, regardless whether it’st h ep u l s e
oximeter sampling data every 1-2 seconds or the general
care nurse checking respiratory rates on their patients
once every 8 hours. The clinical nurse is testing these
patients by sampling their respiratory rates in specific
time sequences and will presumably alarm the appropri-
ate caregiver (and RRT) should that rate go over 30/min
or some other similarly protocolized numeric value
“deemed” to indicate significant respiratory trouble.
Regardless whether the monitor is human or some state-
of-the-art technology, the process is identical with its
capability dependent on the bio-marker selected to
Table 1 Alternative Choices for Numeric Thresholds (used with permission)
VITAL SIGN NUMERIC THRESHOLDS
Bradycardia Tachycardia Hypotension Hypertension Bradypnea Tachypnea SPO2
Calzavacca (2008) <40 >120 <90 <8 >25 <90
Genardi (2008) <40 >130 <90 <8 >24
Hravnak (2008) <40 >140 <80 >200 <8 >36 <85*5 min
Brilli (2007) <8 <90 (Suppl. O2)
Dacey (2007) <50*15 min. >130*15 min <8 >30
Halvorsen (2007) <40 >120 <90 <8 >30 <88 (Suppl. O2)
McFarlan (2007) <51 >120 <91 <8 >24 <90 (RA) or
<92 (Suppl. O2)
Offner (2007) <40 >120 <90 <8 >24
Sebat (2007) <90 >19
Garretson (2006) <40 >130 <90 <8 >30 <90 (Suppl. O2)
Jones (2005) <40 >130 <90 <8 >30 <90 (Suppl. O2)
Hillman (2005) <40 >140 <90 <5 >36
Tibballs (2005) Age Index <90 (Suppl. O2) or
<60 (Cyanotic HD)
Bellomo (2004) <40 >130 <90 <8 >30 <90 (Suppl. O2)
DeVita (2004) <40 >140 <80 >200 <8 >36 <85*5 min
Bellomo (2003) <40 >130 <90 <8 >30 <90 (Suppl. O2)
Buist (2002) >130 <90 <6 >30 <90 (Suppl. O2)
Hodgetts (2002) Weighted
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state-of-being, and its reliability determined by the sensi-
tivity and specificity of this bio-marker’s threshold value.
Today we can show there is a “disconnect” to all this.
The considerable complexity of most clinical conditions
will render incapable most attempts at threshold moni-
toring for it. We can show beyond doubt that all our
currently “deemed” threshold values used today for
exposing respiratory instability fail either to detect its
clinical changes early enough or fail to detect it entirely
with very few specific exceptions. These faux thresholds
have all been derived from over-simplified bio-markers,
and much like mathematical fractions that have been
improperly reduced, they end up incapable of solving
problems, in this case yielding appropriate, timely warn-
ings. In different terms, these over-simplified bio-markers
can be described as information fragments unsuited for
either comprehensive or early detection of respiratory
instability. This points out the importance of respecting
the degrees of complexity that define the clinical condi-
tions to which we need alerting.
Threshold monitoring is really the use of data and time
“snapshots” to render clinical decisions, such as sounding
an alarm. We call this traditional hospital approach,
“data/time fragment guided protocolization” (DFGP).
Threshold based monitors and their associated alarm
processors make up the afferent and efferent components
respectively of these DFGP hospital care processes. This
simple approach has been the basis for the design of hos-
pital alarm processors since the late 1970s. DFGPs work
off basic decision trees, such as “if X then Y” where X is a
fragment of data from a single point (or brief segment) of
time and Y is an action such as the sounding of an alarm
and activation of a rapid response team (RRT). Since
both threshold alarm monitors and RRT activation share
a common DFGP, and both have performed poorly in
prospective clinical trials, the pervasive application of
data-time fragment guided protocolization in hospitals is
now being questioned [15].
While a DFGP can be quite effective when used to
define a straightforward decision protocol based on a
single data-time fragment, this generally applies only
when the simplified or “reduced” DFGP’s data/time frag-
ment accurately reflects the condition to be acted on
and stands the test of time as being both capable and
reliable within a comprehensive range of clinical set-
tings. One example of an effective DFGP is the applica-
tion of a sliding insulin dose based on the patient’s
threshold blood glucose value. However, hospitals, by
deploying threshold based pulse oximeters for early
detection of respiratory distress on general care floors,
extend the application of DFGP inappropriately. Here
the highly complex and varied patho-physiologic pattern
architectures that comprise unexpected respiratory fail-
ure in this environment simply can’t be reduced to sin-
gle, numeric threshold values, i.e. data/time fragments,
and remain capable. It’s the complexity that spoils these
threshold reductions, like a SPO2 breach of 90%, and
any hope of there being straightforward relationships
between X and Y to define a protocol that then reliably
triggers alarms based on such fragments of data and
time. No surprise then, that such protocolization
attempts to date have failed to improve outcomes in
randomized trails [11,16].
These considerations also expose pitfalls that arise
from our traditional reliance on receiver operative curve
relationships (sensitivity and specificity associations) for
providing clinically meaningful endpoints (thresholds)
when studying the reliability of systems designed to
detect data-time fragments from complex conditions.
It’s easy to get confused about exactly what it is we
think we have reliably tested. We already mentioned
“new-generation” motion tolerant pulse oximeters and
their excellent sensitivities and specificities (but without
any meaningful bio-reliability) for recognizing SPO2
threshold breaches of 90% [13]. This sort of confusion
can explain why they failed to yield outcome improve-
ments in a high risk post operative general floor popula-
tion that was at the time expected to benefit from
highly accurate, continuous SPO2 threshold monitoring
[11]. Just as evidentially apparent but still largely under-
appreciated, is that an excellent sensitivity and specifi-
city for detecting one specific cause of respiratory death
(the inadvertent loss of the airway in the operating
room) does not translate into reliable early detection for
the more comprehensive body of clinical patterns that
evolve with unexpected respiratory instability on general
care floors [7]. Different hospital environments can sig-
nificantly skew the kinds of clinical events arising from
patient populations within them as we will discuss, ren-
dering a DFGP of excellent value in one to be near use-
less or possibly even worse in another.
For all these reasons, our trust in threshold applica-
tions for triggering appropriate RRT rescue is beginning
to be reconsidered [9]. The following review offers a
thorough historic and physiologic perspective on our
“fire alarm” methodology anchored by these traditional
data/time fragment guided protocolizations, all within a
context of capable, early detection of life-threatening
clinical instability on hospital general care floors. It also
introduces an alternative approach currently in develop-
ment and based on capable detection, characterization,
quantification and tracking of distinct, relational patho-
physiologic pattern changes over time as they arise from
three distinctly unique clinical pattern architectures
known to frequently end in unexpected hospital death.
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associated clinical pattern architectures)
Hopefully by now you are beginning to entertain the
possibility of there being fundamental flaws to our
threshold based approaches for early detection of clini-
cal instability. We mentioned that attention has now
turned to the development of new alarm processors
much better at responding to early patho-physiologic
pattern changes. These patterns can be read from sig-
nals arising out of three distinct clinical instability pat-
tern architectures. We call these pattern architectures,
“Patterns of Unexpected Hospital Death” (PUHD). Each
PUHD contains elements of respiratory failure and
together they define the majority of significant instabil-
ities encountered in the hospital environment leading to
unexpected morbidity and mortality. While their pat-
terns are not overly complex, neither can the signals
indicating their onset be further reduced to a function
of any single or multi-parameter threshold breach, and
still remain capable of guiding an early response to the
threat they represent. Table 2 defines the clinical pattern
architectures of our three PUHD.
PUHD Type I is considered the most common
mechanism of unexpected death in many hospitals, but
PUHD Types II and III are the most feared because
they have been traditionally associated with clinical
error, and can be drug induced by overdose or discov-
ered after the fact in patients with hidden vulnerabilities
(such as pre-existing sleep apnea).
Conventional wisdom appreciates only the first two of
these three clinical pattern architectures, and then only
in terms of broad generalities with considerable room
for misunderstandings regarding their details. Patients
experiencing the third and most unappreciated PUHD
(associated most commonly with sleep apnea), have rou-
tinely had their clinical courses misattributed to one of
the first two, once the instability has been detected late
or after the fact in an outcome analysis [17]. These diag-
nostic misattributions have perpetuated misunderstand-
ings among well intended clinicians from many
specialties including Anesthesiology, Pulmonary Medi-
cine, Critical Care, and Palliative Medicine. Only
recently have sufficient case reports been published to
unequivocally establish our third pattern’s importance.
We’ll begin our discussion with arguably the most
recognizable of the three, and certainly the PUHD most
likely to be recalled by clinicians when asked to think
back on challenging cases involving unexpected respira-
tory failure they’ve had to manage during their careers.
Type I Pattern of Unexpected Hospital Death (PUHD)
(hyperventilation compensated respiratory failure)
This pattern architecture reflects a clinically evolving
process associated with microcirculatory failure induced
by such common conditions as CHF, sepsis, and pul-
monary embolism to name a few. For this reason it
represents the most familiar general process that
devolves unexpectedly to death occurring in our hospi-
tals today. Its provenance can be described as being a
physiologic response to an earliest posed metabolic and
hypoxic threat, beginning with hyperventilation, primary
respiratory alkalosis, and an increase in blood oxygen
stores. Isolated respiratory alkalosis (RA) has been
shown to be the most common early clinical manifesta-
tion in patients with sepsis, [18-20], CHF [21], and pul-
m o n a r ye m b o l i s m[ 2 2 ] .I tc h a r acteristically evolves into
a persistent alkalosis despite subsequent progressive
increases in anion gap and lactic acid levels, well before
the development of dominate metabolic acidosis (MA).
In fact, during evolving sepsis the brain responds to
endotoxin with a rise in minute ventilation even before
lung water augments the central ventilation drive
[23,24]. These early, incremental steps (initial isolated
RA followed by mixed RA and MA, followed by domi-
nate MA) have also been clearly demonstrated in early
animal sepsis models [24-26]. The typical progression of
Type I PUHD is shown in figure 1.
Predictably, any clinical pattern that progresses from
initial dominate respiratory alkalosis should demonstrate
elevated respiratory rates associated with the rising min-
ute ventilation (Ve) (see figure 1). However, the very
high respiratory rate thresholds (above 30/min) that are
customarily used to trigger RRT activations [1,2], have
been found to occur most commonly in non survivors
Table 2 The Three Clinical Pattern Types of Unexpected Hospital Death (PUHD)
TYPE I Hyperventilation Compensated Respiratory Distress (e.g. Sepsis, PE, CHF)
Stable SPO2 with progressively falling PaCO2 eventually yields to slow SPO2 decline (mitigated by respiratory alkalosis) and followed
by precipitous SPO2 decline when metabolic acidosis dominates
TYPE II Progressive Unidirectional Hypoventilation (CO2 Narcosis)
Progressive rise in PaCO2 (and etCO2) and fall in SPO2 over 15 minutes to many hours. (Often due to overdosing of narcotics or
sedatives)
TYPE III Sentinel Rapid Airflow/SPO2 Reductions Followed by Precipitous SPO2 Fall.
A state of “arousal dependent survival” that occurs only during sleep. Arousal failure allows precipitous hypoxemia during apnea
causing terminal arousal arrest.
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thresholds are breached early in sepsis or any of the
other conditions producing Type I PUHD.
Very high respiratory rates (above 30/min), like high
lactate levels [28], are likely to assist detection only
when severe metabolic acidosis, a late Type I PUHD
manifestation, enters the picture (see the late phase of
figure 1). They are best considered markers of severity
and diagnostic delay [29] rather than useful warnings
for early disease. In fact, since any rise in minute venti-
lation is comprised of both increases in respiratory rate
and tidal volume, the use of the respiratory rate alone
can never by itself reliably provide a determination of
the degree of augmentation of a ventilation response
during Type I PUHD. This early phase does have the
PaCO2 falling, but the PaO2 and SPO2 most often
remain unchanged [30-33] in response to the hyperven-
tilation. While etCO2 closely follows PaCO2 in pediatric
patients [34], the relationship is not always straightfor-
ward in adults [35,36]. Changes in etCO2 early in Type I
PUHD in non-intubated patients on hospital general care
floors have not as yet been described.
As Type I PUHD progresses beyond its initial, isolated
hyperventilation phase, microcirculatory failure (an early
pre-curser and component of shock) develops [37]. In
the lungs, this microcirculatory failure causes a progres-
sive decline in the efficiency of gas exchange [38,39].
However, because the patient already has significantly
increased minute ventilation, the O2 “seen” by the oxi-
meter’sf i n g e r t i pS P O 2s e n s o ro f t e na p p e a r su n c h a n g e d
and stable since greater volumes of oxygen are now
being ventilated into the lungs to maintain normal
blood oxygen levels. The appearance of physiologic sta-
bility, as reflected by these “stable” SPO2 values, persists
as this compensation continues to mount, with heigh-
tened, ever increasing O2 flux though the trachea/
bronchioles required to maintain it. What is actually
being seen by the bedside clinician is pseudo-stability
created from the compensatory ventilatory change,
unfortunately often mistaken for true stability from not
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(breach - 85) 
Onset Potentially Mortal Event       
(e.g. Sepsis, CHF, PE)                
Potentially Fatal False Sense of Security      
(may exceed 12 hours)                     
SpO2
Terminal rise of RR 
due to severe 
metabolic (lactic) 
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SpO2: oxygen saturation; PaCO2: Arterial carbon dioxide tension; PACO2: Alveolar carbon 
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Figure 1 Type I Pattern of Unexpected Hospital Death (e.g. Sepsis, CHF, PE). (Values on Y axis are for reference, actual values for each
parameter will vary significantly).
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pulse oximeter’s output. Put another way, this very com-
mon scenario depicts pulse oximetry’s insensitivity for
detecting Type I PUHD early (the golden period) when
it is most likely to respond to aggressive management.
This likewise explains the well intended but ineffective
orders most often found at this stage along a devolving
Type I process (stepwise increases in the amount of
supplemental oxygen delivered), only stalling the deliv-
ery of more appropriate therapies.
Eventually, despite these ever increasing tracheal O2
fluxes, microcirculatory failure in the lungs does bring
about a fall in PaO2 [40], but this too remains hidden
from the pulse oximeter’sS P O 2s e n s o rb yac o n t e m -
poraneous rise in pH induced from hyperventilation.
Hyperventilation can perpetuate SPO2 values well above
90% regardless a falling PaO2 because of compensatory
molecular changes in the hemoglobin molecule caused
by the respiratory alkalosis [41]. It’s precisely these
early, compensatory physiologic changes in particular,
and the oximetry patterns from Type I PUHD in gen-
eral, that can fool clinicians into mistakenly believing
these patients aren’t in trouble. Threshold pulse oxime-
t r ya l a r m ss e ta tS P O 29 0 %p r o v i d et h i sf a l s es e n s eo f
security when relied on as the “go to” detector for early
respiratory distress, made that much worse if even lower
thresholds for alarming (e.g. 80%-85%) are being
selected to counter what is currently viewed as a “false
positive” alarm problem, another misattribution issue
we’ll be discussing a little later.
As the Type I pattern continues evolving (often over
0.5-48 hours), additional microcirculatory failure and an
increase in endogenous catecholamine release cause a
progressive lactic acidosis [33], which becomes ever
more “naked” through the loss of blood bicarbonate and
other endogenous buffers, so that now the stability of
the patient’s pH is totally dependent on a low PaCO2
maintained through an exhaustive, persistent hyperventi-
latory response. At this juncture the patient has become
highly vulnerable to any interventions that might attenu-
ate an ever more fragile hyperventilation compensatory
drive (e.g. narcotic administration), which without
standby ventilatory support is often lethal. The confor-
mational change in the hemoglobin molecule (left shift
of the oxyhemoglobin disassociation curve) and the high
tracheal/bronchiole O2 flux continues to protect the
SPO2 from falling, but the sustainable compensatory
reserve is rapidly exhausted by an ever higher minute
ventilation demand and further depletion of physiologic
buffers. Any remaining signs of stability cannot be sus-
tained for long, with fulminate decompensation actuated
even earlier by the CHF, septic process, or the PE. Dur-
ing its final sequence, as the patient fatigues [42] or as
the CHF, PE, or sepsis advances, pH begins to decline.
This initial fall in pH then reverses the conformational
change of the hemoglobin molecule shifting the oxyhe-
moglobin curve to the right [33,41], which activates an
accelerating, vicious cycle that includes precipitous
declines in both pH and SPO2, eventually producing a
terminal collapse in ventilation with concurrent, abrupt
rises in PaCO2.
The associated clinical signals of the Type I PUHD
have the SPO2 falling only quite late, but when it does, it
falls precipitously. By the time the SPO2 breaches a
threshold value like 90% or lower, the golden period has
been missed and it is often far too late to intervene with-
out utilizing maximum critical care resources and accept-
ing a much greater probability for hospital morbidity and
mortality. This can also explain a common but incorrect
perception held by many clinicians relying on alarms
from threshold monitoring. They often misinterpret the
fulminate signs and symptoms from these patients as
having developed precipitously, with the accompanying
respiratory work believed to be derived solely as contem-
poraneous compensation for the associated metabolic
acidosis. The truth differs, and it’s not unusual to dis-
cover through careful hindsight inspections of the clinical
observations made during these devolving scenarios that
signals of progressive clinical distress had been present
for hours and sometimes even days before any recogni-
tion and/or definitive action being taken. Likewise, as we
mentioned, these early signals don’t often include signifi-
cant SPO2 change, the unfavorable PaO2 changes
remaining concealed from oximeters because of our
compensatory adaptations, e.g. respiratory alkalosis and
hemoglobin affinity. The patterns typically seen are
imparted from the body’s design to deliver oxygen first
and foremost when the going gets tough. When it simply
can’t go on any further, the hydrogen ion stability, con-
formational changes of the hemoglobin molecule, and fall
in SPO2 combine to produce a resounding state of total
respiratory collapse that’s difficult to miss, with death fol-
lowing quickly. The message is hopefully clear. Threshold
pulse oximetry does little to detect early Type I PUHD. If
anything it works against the clinician, falsely reassuring
when otherwise aggressive strategies might have been
initiated at the onset of subtle respiratory complaints.
To summarize, this unique Type I process starts first
with clinical patterns being signaled from a rising minute
ventilation and a falling PaCO2, then a slow fall in SPO2,
a more rapid rise in minute ventilation (and at this point
a severe rise in respiratory rate and marked additional
fall in PaCO2), followed then by a rapid drop in SPO2
(often only now passing through the SPO2 alarm thresh-
old), and finally (terminally) a fall in respiratory rate and
rise in PaCO2. If supplemental oxygen is provided as is
often the case, e.g. prophylactic or progressive nasal
cannula O2 to manage vague, early symptoms associated
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closer to the death point, prolonging the false senses of
security. Legitimate signal patterns capable of revealing
this Type I process early would have to come from a
constellation of time integrated changes that reflect
steady increases in minute ventilation (airway O2 flux)
with consistent blood gas compensations and subtle,
early hydrogen buffer depletion, all occurring without
significant change taking place in SPO2 observations
(diagnosis by exclusion). This requires a series of com-
plex data fragments to be collected and aligned over
time, all irreducible to the thresholds currently being
used on hospital floors. The sooner we acknowledge this,
the sooner we’ll be able to salvage these patients early
when mortality and morbidity can be reliably avoided.
So exactly how did the magical 90% SPO2 threshold
concept gain its advantage in hospital floor care, while
ever since misguiding so many well intended general
care clinicians? How can so many believe ‘above 90%
SPO2s’ are the sine qua non of respiratory robustness
and breaches of 90% the first indication of trouble? To
understand this well, we’ll have to look at more than
just the science behind respiratory physiology. We need
to detour momentarily and embrace our psyche, taking
a moment to explore the human condition from an evo-
lutionary psychological perspective before easing our-
selves back onto more familiar ground.
Monitoring Revisited With a Twist
We’d suggested at the very beginning of our discussion
that all of us share natural affinities (aka biases). There
are any number of these biases wired into our DNA,
such as our general need and liking to have the vast,
complex information that’s constantly barraging our
senses reduced into more easily interpretable patterns
(even if possible bimodal “on-off” or “safe-unsafe” sig-
nals) with one important stipulation: that we believe and
trust (aka “can be certain”) these reductions are accu-
rate, reliable, and useful representations of the complex-
ity from which they come. In fact, “being certain” is
another example of one of our biases. Evolutionary bio-
psychologists recognize these affinities as being innate,
functionally adaptationist products of natural selection
that enhance our probability for survival, or more accu-
rately the survival of our chromosomes [43-45]. With
this in mind, the short answer explaining our penchant
for simple thresholds, such as our magical 90% SPO2
detector, comes only in small part from it being the way
we’ve been taught. We are much more likely attracted
to trusting these thresholds because of their extremely
easy-to-follow “rules of engagement,” without which we
would be left vulnerable to constant worry, stress, and
indecision managing our sick in need within the con-
fines of our chaotic hospital environments. Combining
anything we’ve been taught with our natural affinities
for simplification, certainty, and summary judgment, the
odds soar for the resulting behaviors ending up cultu-
rally ensconced. Unfortunately, these particular beha-
viors have inadvertently erased our objectivity and made
it extremely difficult for us to detect early patterns of
unexpected hospital death in many of our clinical envir-
onments, a point that should now be obvious from the
details we reviewed regarding Type I PUHD. Type II
and Type III PUHD present their own uniquely challen-
ging problems associated with adapting our simplistic
threshold concepts for their early detection, but we’ll
discuss them after a bit more on just how to date we’ve
gotten so far off track regarding our belief in the cap-
ability of threshold based technologies. Our decades’ old
culture of threshold monitoring has created its own
worldwide infrastructure of monitoring scientists, indus-
trial designers, standards committees, and marketing
teams. Make no mistake about it. This is very much
about big business and big business behaviors. We’ll
take a moment now to penetrate its “veil of science.”
Fundamental to the science and efficacy of threshold
monitoring is the initial choice of a discreet numeric
value within an available set of parametric values to be
used to represent the very best indication that some-
thing important either has, or is about to occur. This
sounds simple enough to do until you begin in earnest
exploring the essential characteristics this value must
have. Knowing for certain an exact value that defines an
important change, like any number over 20 for breaths
per minute with sepsis, won’t necessarily work. It’sn o t
because it isn’t the most sensitive number for the job;
it’s because it is a very non-specific number [46]. This
simply means that if we were to use this as our thresh-
old cutoff value, we’ll certainly capture nearly all early
septic patients as intended, but we’ll also drag lots of
other patients without it along with them, patients who
have other, often innocent reasons for breathing more
quickly. The additional burden these other patients add
from their consumption of a fixed amount of very valu-
able rescue resources would significantly mitigate the
effectiveness of the response to the true event. Arguably
even more detrimental is the amount of rescue response
f a t i g u ep r o d u c e db yt h e s ea d d e df a l s ep o s i t i v ea l a r m s
having to be answered, i.e. the “Cry wolf” effect.
D e s p i t et h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h ep i v o t a lp o s i t i o n so f
threshold values chosen by the monitoring industry, the
actual threshold numbers suggested have been tradition-
ally arbitrary and often capricious. This exposes thresh-
old “science” as conjecture, exemplified by the recent
publication of a matrix of published chosen thresholds
[2], which allow proponents of threshold monitoring to
choose almost any range of trigger values they wish.
Whether capriciously derived or not, for any single
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the chosen value must be both highly sensitive and
highly specific simultaneously regarding all the impor-
tant clinical processes needing detections and interven-
tions. We have already pointed out that the solution
provided by the industry and other active proponents of
thresholds, is to make the target simple and to cite sen-
sitivity and specificity as a function of how accurately
the monitor derives this arbitrary target value. For the
rest of us, this solution should no longer be acceptable
because it skirts the central issue, that being there are
no single threshold values within our vital sign para-
meters routinely monitored on hospital floors today that
are both highly sensitive and highly specific for any of
the early patterns of unexpected hospital death. The
typical numeric values we’ve accepted and worked with
for decades vary widely, but only become consistently
very sensitive and specific together when instability has
long established itself (late) in two of our three PUHD,
while never becoming specific until terminal in our
third. The gap between late and early recognitions for
each pattern architectural type is filled with needless
morbidity, mortality, and cost. This issue constitutes a
huge problem that has set some of us to working dili-
gently for innovative solutions beyond our “tenured”
monitoring traditions, while others continue fighting to
preserve the worn and ineffective status quo.
We’ll make this clearer by revisiting our sepsis example.
An adult respiratory rate in breaths per minute of any
number above 20 has been defined as a component of the
systemic inflammatory response syndrome accompanying
sepsis. While the 20 value chosen as our threshold serves
us well regarding sensitivity, it’s simultaneously very non-
specific. Using it as your alarm threshold would result in
its alarming for large numbers of patients all the time.
Granted, among them you’dc a p t u r ea l ly o u re a r l ys e p t i c
patients, but you’d also be including many non-septic
patients. Most of these would have benign conditions that
would then be labeled as false positives, but only after fati-
guing the nurses and physicians on the floors and con-
suming inordinate amounts of fixed resources. You might
say it’s worth it, and in theory that’s perhaps superficially
admirable, but extremely impractical and disruptive.
Working effectively in a chaotic general care environment
is difficult enough without heaping on the enormous dis-
traction set in play by numerous false alarms. The added
waste of energy, time, and resources combine to make the
environment exponentially less safe, far outweighing the
noble premise behind rescuing sepsis early at all costs.
Only when the respiratory rate breaches 30 breaths per
minute does that particular threshold become reliable,
meaning both sensitive and specific enough for rescue to
be deployed sensibly, but unfortunately now at much later
stages within the devolving disease process. The value ‘30
BrPM’ here is a value of compromise, hinged on the mis-
leading premise “better late than never,” and established to
serve both the greater good and the individual patient
simultaneously. It reflects a process that should get at best
a grade of C-, a process to be merely tolerated while we
figure out ways to deliver an A+ solution. Instead, the pro-
cess has been culturally transformed into one of our gold
standards. Similarly, and we pointed this out earlier, the
90% SPO2 pulse oximeter threshold is also a C- value of
compromise, both sensitive and specific only for late Type
I respiratory instability, not early when Type I has its best
chance of being managed successfully. So how exactly was
the magical 90% SPO2 threshold conjured up? The answer
can be found in its provenance.
The History of Threshold Monitoring on Hospital General
Care Floors
Simple warning electrocardiographic monitoring systems
which triggered alarms in response to high or low heart
rates were developed in the early 1960 s [47], and these
represented some of our earliest threshold monitors.
An arbitrary value from high or low QRS complex occur-
rence rates (heart rate) was selected and an alarm would
sound if this was breached. Low heart rates below
50 beats per minute and high values above 120 were
commonly selected. When the pulse oximeter was intro-
duced in the early 1980 s this same threshold based
approach was applied with 90% arbitrarily made the
SPO2 cutoff value. This choice was largely cultural,
reflecting a general scientific goal at the time to go
metric. Certainly the value derived by subtracting
10 from 100 nicely aligned with that vision. Using
numeric increments of 10 are technically easier to work
with, even if the number isn’tb e i n gd e r i v e dt h r o u g h
“bio"-scientific inquiry. The idea that nature conveniently
provides us with this “ideally” rounded threshold set pre-
cisely at the 90% saturation “knee” of our oxyhemoglobin
dissociation curve was an afterthought that makes little
sense for many reasons. Perhaps the most important of
them is the dissociation curve’s ability to shift both right
and left through sequences within our patterns of evol-
ving death, rendering the concept of the relationship of
the “knee” to a fixed SPO2 threshold meaningless in clin-
ical crisis. However, as already discussed, we like our
complex concepts simplified, and this 90% SPO2 “knee”
featured splendidly as an industry marketing ploy, at
once sounding both impressively sophisticated and easy...
then shortly thereafter becoming enhanced remarkably
through a stroke of serendipity.
Breaking into hospital based healthcare markets has
never been easy, but a path was cleared for oximetry’s
entry into surgical operating suites (ORs). At the time of
its introduction, the most feared mishap arising from
this environment was an undetected loss of airway.
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prevailing risk for airway loss because of the frequent
use of general anesthesia and mechanical ventilation. In
these controlled environments there’s little else that
causes an otherwise stable patient receiving supplemen-
tal oxygen, as most do, to suddenly drop from expected
hemoglobin saturations to 90% or lower. What’sm o r e ,
any desaturation breaching 90% SPO2 with an anesthe-
siologist or critical care physician at that bedside leaves
a m p l et i m ef o rap r o p e r l yd e p l o y e dr e s c u ew i t h o u ta n y
harm coming to the patient. Said another way, these
environments just happen to be uniquely suitable for
this particular threshold monitor because unlike our
Type I example on the general care floor, here a 90%
SPO2 threshold breach is both extraordinarily sensitive
and specific for indicating the near onset of the one
lethal problem most likely to occur, and it triggers into
immediate action its precise correction. It was this quite
unusual alignment of early (near onset) capability and
reliability with the efferent, nearby rescuer that formed
an ideal DFGP (Data-time Fragment Guided Protocoli-
zation)...and it catapulted the perceived value of pulse
oximetry and its reputation for enhancing patient safety
through the stratosphere, but unfortunately without a
contemporary appreciation for why it was bound to suc-
ceed in this environment, but not in others.
An unparalleled enthusiasm for pulse oximetry in the
operating room propelled its nearly instant migration
into special care units like perioperative recovery rooms
and critical care units, where similar risk for airway loss
and the immediate availability of specialty trained, com-
petent airway experts also coexisted. Pulse oximetry’s
life-saving reputation continued to swell, and with it the
single minded opinions of those clinicians used to its
application in these specific locations. Well-intended
anesthesiologists and critical care physicians, because of
their deep but narrowed expertise, couldn’t be faulted
for wanting to enhance patient safety everywhere, but
had sparse experience with the patho-physiologies of
true sleep related upper airway disturbances, or for that
matter with most any general care issues being managed
on the hospital floors. Their misplaced enthusiasm for
deeming pulse oximetry’sS P O 2a so u rn e x t“vital sign”
for all patient environments, along with its magical 90%
threshold, would immediately open Pandora’sB o x .
We’ve seen how ill-suited the 90% SPO2 threshold is for
detecting early Type I PUHD. It was also becoming
evident by the late 1990 s that an untoward clinical
“attitude” was emerging on the floors; that false senses
of security were being encouraged by the 90%
SPO2 threshold, not just delaying early clinical inter-
ventions, but promoting actual discounting of fairly
obvious clinical symptoms. In previous decades a nurse
or house officer would likely have proceeded with a
comprehensive evaluation of any complaints of dyspnea,
probably ordering at minimum a blood gas and chest
radiograph. Now, reassured by accompanying saturations
in the 90%s, these “reassurances” were being routinely
passed along to struggling patients with unintentionally
glib remarks like, “You’re breathing just fine, your oxygen
level is nearly 100%...if you’re still short of breath in the
morning, I’ll call the doctor...” T h ed i s s e r v i c eh e r et o
patients should now be obvious, and while perhaps not
nearly so obvious, the rejoinder now being heard for
maintaining these incapable thresholds, “Better late than
never,” should be viewed as equally glib and “saturated”
with danger.
Beyond these troubling challenges, pulse oximetry’s
entry into the general care culture in the late 1990 s
brought with it a degree of disruption never previously
experienced in hospital medicine. The general care
floors became instantly inundated with countless alarm
events that would for years to come and even today be
misdiagnosed, misattributed, and misunderstood. What’s
worse, some leaders within the oximetry industry today,
like carpenters owning only a hammer tend to see
everything as a nail, are now suggesting “solutions” that
call for adjusting the SPO2 threshold values for our
floor care downward, a solution that frankly defies all
logic. To fully understand oximetry’s disruptive potential
and why the technology needs to be overhauled entirely
rather than “threshold modified,” we need to examine
next the details of PUHD Type II and III.
Type II Pattern of Unexpected Hospital Death (CO2
narcosis)
Well back before the 1950 s [48] and even today, nurses
and physicians in training are taught that narcotics pro-
duce death through a singular path involving progressive
hypoventilation. Perceived as a deteriorating, self propa-
gating process, both the narcotics and a rising PaCO2
contribute to the central depression of ventilatory drive.
This “vicious cycle” of narcotic induced central depres-
sion begins with its pharmacologic induction of a rise in
PaCO2 from neuro-inhibition at the brainstem’s ventro-
lateral medulla pre-Botzinger complex [49,50], that then
furthers this central depressive state, ultimately leading
to “Carbon Dioxide Intoxication” or “CO2 Narcosis”
severe enough to bring on respiratory arrest. Put
another way, this represents a distinct form of central
nervous system depression resulting in slowed and shal-
low breathing caused by μ-opioid (μ2 subtype) receptor-
mediated blockade [51] and possibly also involving
active intermediary metabolites of certain narcotics [52],
ion trapping in the brain [53], and poor excretion
kinetics. Hypoxemia may be evident only terminally in
this process if the patient is receiving sufficient supple-
mental oxygen [54]. As respiratory failure and death
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gen can hide it and its pathognomonic SPO2 pattern
signals entirely from the pulse oximeter until very late
[55,56], just as it does with Type I PUHD.
Although recently eclipsed by our nascent realization
that “CO2 Narcosis” may not be the most common rea-
son for patients dying silently at night after receiving
narcotics, there is no question that this Type II clinical
process poses a legitimate threat. Some patients, often
hidden in our pre and postoperative populations, are at
very high risk for postoperative hypoventilation when
given what’s considered normal doses of sedatives and/
or narcotics. Classic cases of this are seen in adult
patients with congenital central hypoventilation syn-
drome, e.g. those with PHO2XB mutations [57] who can
be completely asymptomatic while awake, yet despite
normal daytime PaCO2s, exhib i tp r o f o u n dh y p o v e n t i l a -
tion responses to sedation and narcotics once asleep.
Others at risk include patients with obesity hypoventila-
tion syndrome [58], chest wall deformities, polio seque-
lae, advanced COPD [59], and severe hypothyroidism
[60]. Then there’s always the possibility of an accidental
narcotic overdose, although our currently piqued aware-
ness regarding medication error has resulted in a wide
range of preemptive processes being applied by most
hospitals to prevent this.
Our thinking dating back to the 1980 s regarding how
we can best monitor for opioid induced respiratory
depression called for monitoring the respiratory rate.
While some studies have shown that respiratory rate
reductions provide a useful indication of ventilatory
depression in some patients [61,62], there’sa l s oe v i -
dence to suggest that it’s not quite that simple. Several
studies have shown opioid and sedative induced respira-
tory depression to be frequently associated with reduc-
tions in tidal volume and more variable patterns of
breathing [63-65]. In fact, the hypoventilation produced
by some benzodiazepines may primarily reduce tidal
volumes with accompanying increases in respiratory rate
[66]. In obese patients, or others with narrow or non-
patulous upper airways, tidal volumes may be further
reduced through increases in upper airway resistance
induced by opioids [67,68], suggesting that any relative
reductions in rate and/or tidal volume are likely to be
highly variable depending on both patient and drug
related factors. Because in so many cases tidal volume
may be reduced to a significantly greater extent then
respiratory rate, the application of threshold respiratory
rate monitoring as the single surrogate marker for
opioid-induced respiratory depression can easily provide
false senses of security. The addition of pulse oximetry
to intermittent or continuous respiratory rate monitor-
ing may be just as inadequate if supplemental oxygen is
being provided [55]. Pulse oximetry can be quite
sensitive for detecting Type II PUHD once moderate
hypercarbic levels are reached if a patient is breathing
room air, because the moderate increases in PaCO2
begin to “crowd out” available oxygen at the alveolar
interface resulting in relative hypoxia with noticeably
declining SPO2 values [69]. However, it remains quite
insensitive to even profound hypercarbia when supple-
mental oxygen is used, as is the current trend in early
postoperative management where higher doses of narco-
tics are more likely to be seen [54,55].
So in summary, (as illustrated in figure 2) the Type II
P U H Dc o m p r i s e sf i r s taf a l li nV e( t h ea m o u n to fa i r
moved in or out of the lungs per minute) due to pro-
gressive falls in tidal volume and/or respiratory rate,
both unpredictably variable. This pattern continues to
devolve as the body, failing to rid itself of its excess
CO2 mounting from inadequate ventilation, begins to
suffer from the effects of respiratory acidosis and CO2
narcosis. As the PaCO2 rises higher and higher, it com-
petes with oxygen for space at the alveolar interface,
seen reasonably early as a falling SPO2 in patients
breathing room air (see figure 2). Because any acute rise
in PaCO2 is also associated with falls in pH that shift
the oxyhemoglobin disassociation curve to its right,
monitored SPO2 declines are magnified by these pH/
PaCO2/PaO2 shift effects on the SPO2. However,
patients provided with supplemental oxygen can main-
tain SPO2 values in the 90-100% range with significantly
advanced hypercarbia (see figure 2 dotted line), often
the first hint of a problem coming from being discov-
ered unarousable in near respiratory arrest or worse.
Putting all this in a context of reliability and DFGP cap-
ability for early detection and rescue using our magical
90% threshold, pulse oximetry is moderately sensitive
only when patients breathe room air, and extremely
insensitive when supplemental oxygen is being deployed.
Combining sedation scoring and threshold capnometry
with pulse oximetry has been advocated by some
experts, and this combination appears capable of provid-
ing an effective way to detect pure Type II PUHD
[70,71], although such additions would be costly and
less effective than imagined because of confounding cir-
cumstances. What confounds any reliable early detection
of Type II patterns (Type I as well) by all threshold
applications is our third PUHD, a clinically subtle yet
exceedingly common process that only occurs during
sleep, and just like the others is not amenable to reliable
early detection with any form of threshold monitoring.
Likewise, it remains indistinguishable by even the most
meticulous sedation scoring. This Type III PUHD,
which has been associated with silent, sudden death
during sleep, is largely unknown to most clinicians, yet
burdens the general care environments with extraordi-
narily common clinical and statistical mischief regarding
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co-morbid associations. We’ll have a look at this third
PUHD now.
Type III Pattern of Unexpected Hospital Death (Repetitive
reductions in airflow (RRA) and SPO2 during sleep
followed by arousal failure and sudden hypoxic death)
Having just discussed the prevailing belief held for dec-
ades (and still being taught in Medical Schools) on the
cause of respiratory failure and death induced by narco-
tics and sedatives, we’re now ready to unsettle any cer-
tainty and comfort this simplistic belief might provide.
A “stand alone” Type II concept has fomented the
widely held perception that sedation scoring with
threshold alarms, whether from pulse oximeters using
SPO2 limits or capnometry using some form of accessi-
ble CO2 threshold, can capably and reliably provide
early enough detection to allow timely rescue and rever-
sal before harm intervenes. So if otherwise informed
clinicians are aware only of Type I and II PUHD, as
most today are, then they would believe that setting a
pulse oximeter’s threshold to 90% would render it cap-
able of detecting advanced Type I instabilities, but
would at least allow it to catch Type II reasonably early
if their patients aren’t receiving supplemental oxygen. It
wouldn’t be unreasonable for them to also believe this is
better than missing both types by not using oximetry at
all (discounting our false sense of security issue). They’d
likely reason as well that a combination of pulse oxime-
try and capnometry with frequent sedation score sam-
plings would ensure a safe environment wherever
parenteral narcotics were being administered...and they’d
be standing in good company because this is exactly the
current thinking being fostered by some very bright
healthcare leaders as it relates to improving hospital
floor safety. However, a well concealed and unappre-
ciated, yet extraordinarily common third PUHD has
been making its nefarious presence felt for as long as
we’ve been administering parenteral analgesia in hospi-
tals. It ironically was brought to light by the pulse oxi-
meter’s entrée into general care, the irony stemming
from a decade’s worth of misattributed Type III attenu-
ated (smoothed and unreliable) oximetry signals
acquired off patients on hospital floors that have all but
made threshold SPO2 monitoring (threshold capn-
ometers are just as vulnerable) near useless for reliable
early detections of all three PUHD.
Back in 2002, Lofsky [17] described in the malpractice
literature a cluster of unexpected hospital deaths invol-
ving patients with risk factors for obstructive sleep
apnea. These patients had all died in bed and in spite of
acceptable dosing of narcotics. Surprisingly, they all
shared a unique clinical course that started with being
awake, alert, and stable, then sleeping, and then being
found dead. The standard dogma prevailed at the time,
the thinking being that these deaths occurred because of
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Figure 2 Type II Pattern of Unexpected Hospital Death (CO2 Narcosis).
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the problem could have been avoided simply by using
threshold monitoring, either oximetry, capnometry, or
both. Now we have good evidence refuting this selective
conclusion, showing that subgroups of patients with
obstructive sleep apnea, can demonstrate independent,
severely delayed arousals in response to their apneas
(called occult arousal failure). This condition produces a
distinct, high resolution SPO2 respiratory pattern during
sleep, which we’ve named the Type III PUHD (Pattern
of Unexpected Hospital Death). It differs from our clas-
sic Type II CO2 narcosis process, in that it occurs only
during sleep. When awake, patients with profound Type
III arousal failure may exhibit no pathognomonic symp-
toms or signs, or show evidence of any “awake” seda-
tion. In other words, patients with arousal failure are
orphaned, remaining completely concealed within our
typical pre and postoperative populations. As shown in
figure 3, the sentinel instability component of Type III
PUHD is induced by sleep apnea in the presence of
arousal failure.
This Type III pattern architecture is comprised of
repetitive reductions in airflow and SPO2 from sleep
related cycling collapses of the upper airway [72,73].
This cycling figure 4, collapsing, and reopening of the
upper airway produces a typical and very distinctive pat-
tern of signal clusters shown in figure 5, that is reliably
acquired only by higher resolution pulse oximetry
(unlike many conventional pulse oximetry systems in
use on hospital floors today). How this unique SPO2
pattern is produced will be discussed in a moment, but
more contemporary bench research on how narcotics
interact with our neuroaxis corroborates these impor-
tant, newly appreciated patterns and their implied
threats that include being capable of inducing a de novo
form of sleep disordered breathing with repetitive air-
flow reductions very similar to that found in obstructive
sleep apnea populations.
Current research describes narcotics modulating ade-
nosine levels in two critical areas of the brain that influ-
ence arousal states, the pontine reticular formation
(PRF) and the substantia innominata within the basal
forebrain (BF) [74]. Homeostatis between sleep and
wakefulness is maintained through interactions among
dozens of disparate nuclei spread along the entire neu-
roaxis. The neural circuits regulating arousal state form
Figure 3 Type III Pattern of Unexpected Hospital Death (Sleep Apnea with Arousal Failure).
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or wake-active neurons are firing. Arousal-promoting
nuclei (located predominantly in the pons, midbrain,
and basal forebrain) and sleep-promoting nuclei (located
predominantly in the preoptic hypothalamus) mutually
antagonize each other via reciprocal inhibitory connec-
tions. Narcotics have been shown to reduce adenosine
levels in these critical areas of the brain [75] and this
appears to lead to a disrupted sleep architecture, block-
ing access to rapid eye movement sleep and to the dee-
per restorative stages of non-rapid eye movement sleep.
Doubtlessly, the body of research available today on
opioids suggests strongly that narcotics have a much
broader effect on brain function than that traditionally
attributed to causing Type II PUHD.
As illustrated in figure 4, obstructive sleep apnea can
be best understood as a condition where during sleep,
one’s upper airway collapses and is held closed by vigor-
ous but ineffective respiratory effort (much like trying to
suck on a collapsed cellophane straw). Each apnea in a
repetitive sequence of cyclic apneas is generally termi-
nated by a micro-arousal that occurs when the person
Figure 4 The Mechanism of the Cycling SPO2 Pattern of the Type III PUHD.
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ple of known components. The arousal then causes brief
“overshoot” hyperventilation that drives the PaCO2
below normal. This excessive drop in PaCO2 triggers a
fall in one’s central drive to breathe and a contempora-
neous fall in the central tone of the upper airway. Since
the upper airway is already unstable it collapses again,
causing the cycle to reenter and self propagate, produ-
cing its sentinel pattern of repetitive reductions in air-
flow and SPO2 [72]. Narcotics [67,68,76], spinal
anesthesia [77], sedatives [78] and cycling hypoxemia
[79] can increase one’s arousal threshold (cause arousal
delay), and then death can occur from complete arousal
failure (arousal arrest) [80,81]. So the Type III pattern
comprises a sentinel grouping of repetitive reductions in
airflow (RRA) that produces rapidly cycling SPO2 levels
[72] and brain oxygen level reductions [82] with the risk
of subsequent, precipitous falls in SPO2 to the point of
arousal arrest. Once this occurs, if no intervention is
provided immediately, a Type III death will follow sud-
denly during sleep without warning due to precipitous
hypoxemia, and most often without much progressive
PaCO2 elevation because of insufficient time for the
hypercarbia to develop.
Explanations about the mechanics of self rescue from
sleep apneas today include increases in chemical drive
that can both excite the upper airway dilating muscles
[83] and foment arousal [84]. Arousal has been consid-
ered the most essential survival mechanism for these
patients in a sense because they sleep in a state of per-
petual “arousal dependent survival” with scores of
cycling apneas occurring hourly, each of which must be
reversed by an arousal to prevent sudden sleeping
death. Unfortunately for a subset of these patients, they
also have arousal failure [68,78] where their physiologic
arousal response to apnea events is delayed significantly,
allowing apnea mediated oxygen reductions to progress
to severe desaturation levels before arousal reopens
their upper airways allowing recovery (figure 5). Any-
thing that might additionally delay these recoveries, e.g.
narcotics, creates an extraordinary risk for respiratory
arrest [80,81].
Both the cause and incidence of arousal failure in
patients with sleep apnea have not been well defined,
but it’s now known to be not nearly as uncommon as
originally thought. It has been postulated that our cen-
tral arousal systems may acquire arousal failure over
time as a function of neural plasticity in response to
repetitive exposures to rapid declines in oxygen satura-
tion over many years. As the central arousal system
adjusts its response, the arousal itself can become pro-
gressively more delayed (much as it would to intermit-
tent loud sounds after years of sleep exposure to the
passing of nearby trains). Patients with sleep apnea
g e n e r a l l yh a v er e p e t i t i v ee x p o s u r et o5 0o rm o r ee p i -
sodes of brief hypoxemias every night, and therefore
may be at particular risk for acquired arousal failure.
This is particularly true of obese patients who on aver-
age have more severe cyclic desaturations [85,86]. Their
arousal responses to episodes of hypoxemia may become
progressively attenuated, requiring ever increasing levels
of arterial hypoxemia to induce awakening. If they pre-
sent for surgery, there is no conventional way to know
(unless previously studied) that their arousal system is
failing. Whether arousal failure is genetic or acquired
over time, patients in perioperative populations with this
disorder tolerate long arousal delays, their arterial oxy-
gen saturation values routinely falling into near life
threatening ranges many times during sleep, and each
time their late arousal recoveries rescuing them from an
arousal arrest that can be only seconds away.
One reason arousal delay becomes so critical is that
SPO2 is able to fall at very rapid rates during apnea.
Many physicians accustomed to witnessing preoxyge-
nated apnea lack a full appreciation for the extremely
early and very steep desaturation slopes seen in recum-
bent, obese patients with low functional residual capaci-
ties, breathing room air. With these kinds of apneas, the
rate at which arterial oxygen declines is inversely related
to the volume of oxygen within the lungs at the apnea’s
onset, and for many postoperative patients breathing
room air this volume can be quite low. In fact, since
postoperative functional residual capacity does not have
definable lower limits, oxygen desaturation rates may in
some cases exceed 1.5% per second with SPO2 falling
to critical values with no time for contemporaneous
hypercarbia to develop [87]. This is best understood by
reading Wilkinson et.al’s remarkable article [88] explain-
ing this dynamic process. It demonstrates profound
rates of SaO2 decline from these rapidly cycling apneas
because of multiple airway collapses that occur in
sequences typical for sleep apnea combined with arousal
failure. Using high resolution pulse oximetry, the com-
ponents of these patterns can be accurately analyzed
and defined [72,82]. With most rapidly falling desatura-
tions, each SPO2’s fall is interdicted by an expected
arousal that precipitously reopens the airway. But occa-
sionally, in the presence of severe arousal failure, a
patient’s arterial oxygen saturation can fall to a point
where the brain no longer receives sufficient oxygen for
central arousal to occur [68,80,81]. This is called the
“Lights Out Saturation” (LOS) and happens because our
brains are incapable of generating sufficient anaerobic
metabolism. We all depend on a continuous supply of
oxygen to support our brains’ higher functions (such as
arousal). If arterial oxygen saturations fall below this
critical value where the hemoglobin molecule simply
cannot release sufficient oxygen to the brain, EEG
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suppressed: the “lights are out.”
Once the LOS is breached, airway reopening without
resuscitation isn’t to be expected. Unless discovered
quickly, this sleeping brain soon dies. Tragically how-
ever, the body remains alive and continues to burn glu-
cose and fat, while producing carbon dioxide that
remains trapped because of the collapsed upper airway
and absent ventilation, preventing its escape. During this
sequence the heart continues to pump ever mounting
CO2 stores through an anoxic body. If the patient is dis-
covered now and resuscitation initiated, the immediately
drawn blood gas will show the PaCO2 to be quite high,
disguising this incident as a Type II event. This accounts
for our extended history of so often incorrectly attribut-
ing these events to narcotic induced CO2 narcosis.
Terminally, ventricular fibrillation, pulseless electrical
activity, agonal rhythms, and asystole follow, and the
body then dies.
Restated, the major factors capable of inducing such
sudden, sleeping deaths (Type III PUHD), are the amal-
gam of first an underlying (or induced) sleep breathing
disorder that requires an arousal response, and with it
an added delay in arousal from well intended adminis-
trations of sedation or narcotics most likely imposed on
some degree of preexisting arousal failure. It’s also prob-
able that narcotics are capable of inducing a de novo
form of disordered breathing with sleep, independent
from its ability to also delay arousal [89]. With both
mechanisms in play, the nadir of oxygen saturations
brought on by cycling apneas and incomplete recoveries
can together produce sufficient cerebral hypoxemia to
induce “arousal arrest” [68,80,81]. Then the airway
doesn’t reopen and without immediate help death fol-
lows. This is a very plausible explanation for why these
patients are found “dead in bed” with no warning, and
why patient controlled analgesia (PCA) may not be as
safe as originally advertised, particularly for patients
who exhibit these distinct Type III clinical pattern
anomalies [76].
In summary, on all general care floors and most cer-
tainly on post surgical units, if sleep apnea with its
unique state of arousal dependent survival exists but is
either unrecognized or is left untreated, only the cycling
SPO2 signals acquired off high resolution pulse oximetry
can provide sentinel markers for both cyclical apnea
occurrences and arousal failure. The administration of
narcotics and/or sedatives to patients with preexisting
arousal failure can further delay an already failing arou-
sal to the point of arousal arrest. This then completes
the pattern architecture associated with Type III PUHD,
comprised of sentinel cyclic desaturations followed by
precipitous falls in SPO2 to the point of incapacity for
self recovery and death. Understanding the importance
of these high resolution signal patterns should clearly
expose our patients’ vulnerability when depending on
standard threshold monitoring to assure their safety.
The threshold premise relies on a now singular and
credulous 1980’s and 1990’s concept (Type II PUHD)
for narcotic induced death. The PCA’s( P a t i e n tC o n -
trolled Analgesia) self medicating design was also based
on this oversimplified explanation of death.
If a clinician’s understanding is limited to only this
Type II explanation, his/her belief that central depres-
sion prevents patients from the possibility of self medi-
cating to overdose proportions would logically follow,
albeit remain incorrect. Remember, the Type III Pattern
was not known about when the PCA was introduced,
but we should now be very concerned that patients at
r i s kf o rT y p eI I IP U H Dc a nb ee a s i l ya w a k e n e db y
severe, rapidly cycling hypoxemias (figure 5) or a room
disturbance like a blood pressure check at night, become
alert enough to be cognizant of their postoperative pain,
then self medicate, fall back to sleep, and now drift to
only seconds away from being found dead-in-bed. The
fundamental concept that supports satisfactory “awake”
sedation scores and ability to press a PCA button being
sufficient to prevent narcotic induced sleep death is
flawed. Favorable sedation scores while awake, or the
requirement to press buttons while awake, do not pro-
tect patients from being at risk for death while asleep.
Interestingly as an aside, the “discovery” of Type III
PUHD as plausible cause for “Dead-in-Bed Syndrome”
explains the often discounted statements made by many
highly experienced, attentive nurses and physicians who
in the past have had to defend themselves while under
peer and malpractice review. Sadly, testimony asserting
their postoperative patients were wide awake, completely
alert with satisfactory sedation scores and asking for
pain medication only minutes from being discovered
dead, was rarely convincing.
Conventional threshold pulse oximeters are not cap-
able of distinguishing discrete Type III signal patterns,
either their cyclical desaturation clusters or the distinc-
tive patterns of arousal failure. Their signal sampling,
smoothing, and averaging algorithms prevent this high
resolution capability. But they do alarm frequently from
what they’re able to process (a much less specific, collat-
eral signal composite of merged and attenuated, real-
time information). Derived through signal filtering, aka
signal “smearing”, these composite patterns unfortu-
nately offer no interpretable details for risk assessment,
as do our more distinct, high resolution patterns. Before
our discovery of Type III PUHD, the incessant alarming
introduced to the floors by this monitor was attributed
to “false positive” triggering from signal noise and
motion artifact. Regardless their origin, this posed an
enormous nuisance to all clinicians forced to work
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pattern architecture, now see most of these “smeared”
desaturation signals as instead being “true positives,”
meaning they’re real...just too indistinct to reliably allow
any differentiation between those reflecting milder,
benign forms of sleep breathing disorders from others
depicting the ominous sentinel patterns of cycling with
arousal failure. We’ll soon discuss in more detail what
was to come from the inevitable clash between these
legitimate but “smeared” Type III patterns and the huge
disruptive element brought with them.
For now, let’s revisit our fundamentals in summary.
Standard threshold pulse oximetry on general care floors
can serve only as a model to learn and deviate from if
we’re committed to detecting and distinguishing the
three PUHD early. At best it’s a selective late detector,
made even later by our now being asked to reset its
t h r e s h o l dt oa b s u r d l yl o w e rv a l u e s ,e . g .8 0 % .T h i sn e w ,
industry supported, recommendation is being promoted
as an “actionable threshold,” perhaps because any sus-
tained breach of such an extreme value would necessa-
rily mandate resuscitation. However, resetting a pulse
oximeter’s threshold to 80% can only expose patients
with Type I and II instability to further inaction and
delay. All the recommendation really does is suppress
the incessant alarming from “smeared” Type III patterns,
the bulk of which self corrects through arousal. It’st h e
industry’s “Better late than never” monitoring mantra on
steroids! From a business perspective, it markets the
ability to monitor every patient on every floor while not
being driven insane by constant alarming, and offers the
reassurance that if you do monitor each and every
patient, you won’t be surprised by “Dead in Bed” events.
But what’s not told or even well understood is that
you’re essentially trading away these occasional “Dead in
Bed” events for a considerably more common and costly
critical care mortality and morbidity that further delays
in Type I and II PUHD detection are sure to bring. We
are suggesting that these recommended threshold modi-
fications are more likely an industry’s final (and some-
what desperate) attempt to preserve its now thirty year
old threshold paradigm, perhaps unintentionally, but
certainly inevitably exposing considerably more patients
to further harm than can be possibly helped. Indeed, the
industry’s “Better late than never” mantra is a double
edged scalpel, wounding far more than it heals when
used to justify sustaining such an incapable status quo.
Discussion
From the success it enjoyed in Operating Rooms and
Specialty Care Units [90] came the assumption by the
late 1990 s, albeit without much forethought, that
threshold pulse oximetry (its policies included, e.g. 90%
threshold) would seamlessly transition into the general
care environment and culture without a wrinkle. How-
ever, significant problems were to surface immediately,
the majority having little to do with issues of false secur-
ity or obvious reductions in safety. Rather, these pro-
blems cut to the very heart of our human condition, our
fundamental need for a sane working environment.
Floor nurses found themselves immediately over-
whelmed by incessant alarms blaring each time a resting
patient began to cycle into their repetitive sleep apnea
related desaturations. Figure 6 shows how threshold
alarm processors reduce Type III patterns to states of
“Alarm on” OR “Alarm off”.
These alarms were triggering so frequently, nurses
were forced to come up with ingenious ways to control
the disruption without disregarding policy. While their
solutions were highly creative, they weren’t always
patient centric or in keeping with optimizing safety.
One personal favorite is having the audible pulse tone
and alarm on patient room oximeter dialed up to full
volume, while the duplicate signals being sent off to the
central nursing station are respectively muted and dis-
armed. Clever stuff, albeit a tad self serving, what people
will come up with to preserve their sanity. Admittedly
unfortunate for the room’s occupant, their being kept
awake all night, but certainly an effective way to curtail
any possibility of disordered breathing while sleeping.
Because nothing was known about Type III patterns at
the time and most patients were self rescuing through
arousal anyway, the alarming problem was attributed to
incidental patient movement and signal noise. Regard-
less, it was causing both widespread “alarm fatigue” (an
already well recognized threat to patient safety) right
from the start [91-94], and even worse for industry busi-
ness...monitor abandonment. This drove industry leaders
to begin looking for solutions through design improve-
ments made to their motion attenuation filters in the
oximetry sensors. While a separate issue and never a
problem in the operating rooms, movement needed to
be accounted for on hospital floors. Patient motion,
especially from the finger where the sensor attached,
could back then easily corrupt its signal and generate a
false alarm. But this issue was just confounding the
more important physiologic challenges being faced but
not seen, the pervasive airflow reductions and associated
desaturations that were occurring during sleep in the
hospital.
Nevertheless, the prevailing view maintained that a
new generation of “motion resistant” pulse oximetry
would solve these problems [12,13], but then a large
randomized prospective trial by Ochroch et al. com-
pleted at the University of Pennsylvania in 2006 [11]
using threshold based, motion tolerant oximetry failed
to show any clinical benefit overall, discrediting the “the
false positive alarm premise” as the reason for its lack of
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covery; that threshold triggered pulse oximetry poten-
tially has a dichotomous effect, helping some but
adversely affecting others. This explains what is now
called the “threshold oximetry paradox”, a dichotomy
where clinicians anecdotally observe that pulse oximetry
can provide pivotal warnings for some patients, while
randomized controlled clinical trials fail to reflect any
overall benefit. The findings of this Penn trial suggest
that these benefits to some patients were somehow
being offset in others, so that in aggregate the threshold
triggers were not helpful on the general floors studied.
In spite of the mounting, contrary evidence and all the
initial disruption, our seduction by over-simplified
threshold applications like standard pulse oximetry on
the hospital floors continued. Many legitimate reasons
can explain this, and none are meant to demean. There
is a tendency for all of us to forget complex, abstract
t h e o r yw h i l ei m m e r s e di nm o m e n tt om o m e n tc h a o sa s
is so often the case in our hospitals. The statistical pro-
files of our monitoring and testing applications aren’t
easy concepts to grasp, and most of us can use regular
reviews on the complexities represented by our PUHDs.
This would include physicians as well as those dedicated
clinicians most closely aligned to the hospital floor
environments, our hard working floor nurses. They,
quite honestly, were never trained to know these details
we’ve been covering. Oximetry and its ill-fitting policy
were largely forced on them. They, in return and with-
out meaningful physician-led guidance, were compelled
to modify their policies in ways that made sense to
them, creating value through compromise. In order to
assimilate pulse oximetry and not completely unravel
their myriad workflow processes and policies that might
otherwise endanger their patients, they created many
interesting ways to work around its flaws. None of the
references cited in this paper are even on their radar,
and aren’t suppose to be. In addition, few physicians
understand themselves how this stuff works, or have the
time to teach our nurses the information we’ve covered.
Those physicians most likely to ‘get it” are most often
sequestered within their own unique environments like
Critical Care Units, ORs, ERs, Post Anesthesia Care
Units (PACU), and Sleep Laboratories. Critical Care
Physicians are familiar with unstable patients because
that’s all they treat. Their patients start improving,
wham, they’re transferred to the floor, essentially disap-
pearing. Anesthesiologists may be familiar with OR and
PACU airway threats, but have scant experience with
the floor events being discussed. ER Physicians are triage
specialists, typically working tirelessly and quickly with
some of the least sophisticated monitoring in the hospi-
tal, while Sleep Specialists are hidden away in environ-
ments furthest from our hospital floors. The monitoring
industry has been the ongoing default educator for
many of our nurses, and all business bias aside, from
where do they get their clinical insight? Anesthesiolo-
gists and Critical Care Physicians...clinicians least famil-
iar with the hospital floors’ special needs.
This pervasive ineffectiveness contributes heavily to
many ill-advised decisions, like the nascent movement
toward “actionable thresholds” supported by the oxime-
try industry. Its “raising-the-threshold” technique (low-
ering the threshold value) on alarm triggers essentially
remains untested in controlled, randomized trials to
date, but our collection of solid clinical references
regarding Types I, II, and III PUHDs should support
your taking a justifiably skeptical position when asked to
believe the best answer for detecting any serious clinical
instability early is simply to select a more extreme
threshold value, like an SPO2 of 80% or heart rates
greater than 140 bpm [95]. Implementing extreme
threshold values can certainly mitigate alarm fatigue, but
any comfort provided by the silence will last only until
the nurses, doctors, and families involved discover their
patient near death.
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Figure 6 “Alarm Fatigue” induced by the Type III pattern of figure 5.
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and heart rate thresholds expose the arbitrary and capri-
cious provenance of all threshold values, and perhaps
competency weaknesses of those making the recommen-
dations. These thresholds are so readily modified
because they were chosen as “best guesses” to begin
with, without any analysis of the actual instability pat-
terns generating their breaches. These new recommen-
dations haven’t been properly analyzed either. We’ve
already discussed how our original (less extreme)
thresholds are able to become reliable data/time frag-
ments (achieving high sensitivity and specificity simulta-
neously), but when coupled with RRT activation in a
DFGP, the overall process only capably detects and
manages late instability leading to disappointing out-
comes. Recall our beginning point. The highly complex
and varied patho-physiologic patterns comprising unex-
pected instability in the general care environment simply
can’t be reduced to single, numeric threshold values
capable of the early detection essential for successful
rescues. Now the industry and its vested supporters are
telling us to extend these arbitrary data/time fragments
out even further, rendering them significantly less cap-
able than they already are. Knowing people in the indus-
t r ya sw ed o ,w eu n d e r s t a n dt h e i ri n t e n t i o n sa r e
principled, but they’re going at this the wrong way.
They can’t be blamed for scrambling to find solutions to
the disruption problem, but these efforts reflect their
significant lack of clinical understanding pertinent to
the care being delivered on hospital floors. Blind, per-
sisting loyalty to these threshold applications, and the
threshold paradigm in general, is frankly both unsafe
and dangerous.
An alternative effort to improve patient monitoring
has focused on mathematically fusing multiple para-
metric values such as SPO2, heart rate, respiration rate,
temperature, and in some cases etCO2 through statisti-
cal modeling, the composite then able to generate a
variety of derivative indices [1,96], at once more statisti-
cally sound (reliable) and more capable. While this
approach provides a larger and more robust data/time
fragment and is an improvement, it remains an over-
simplistic DFGP model, accordingly suffering from
many of the same limitations as our traditional thresh-
olds. It’s becoming clear that more physiologic informa-
tion must be synthesized to generate improved alarm
systems and RRT triggers so that they can perform to
optimal effect in this complex environment.
In response to these new realizations, the attention of
the industry is now being redirected toward the develop-
ment of a new class of patient monitor which, rather
than alarming in response to simple threshold breaches,
detects, identifies, quantifies and tracks the actual or
conformational patterns of evolving death as they
develop relationally across multiple parameters over
time. An analogy in industry would be automotive trac-
tion control, where a computer detects and quantifies
the relational pattern of a skid to provide an optimal
response. A simplified example of this alternative
approach can be envisioned by imagining a programmed
patient monitor capable of detecting and tracking the
relational geometric patterns drawn off the conventional,
high resolution signals shown in figures 1, 2, 3. This
would include an alarm processor programmed to auto-
matically detect and quantify these patterns and identify
the pattern types, finally tracking their severity over
time so the response of any particular pattern to treat-
ment can be monitored as well. Regardless the approach
taken, there is general agreement that new and radical
paradigms are required to engage the clinical complex-
ities under discussion. The unique requirements for
more patient-centered cognitive support systems means
accepting that incremental advances in data fusion and
statistical processing are insufficient [97]. The limita-
tions of data/time fragment guided protocolization man-
date that the processing engage the EMR so that all
relevant data available can be included in the analysis
going forward. The requirement for computational
transparency, as well as the ability to process large par-
allel data streams across different scales in real time
severely limit the options within our dominate technolo-
gic paradigms today [97]. Bottom line, the status quo
and its derivatives get a generous C- in an industry
where we all should insist on straight A’s.
For those readers more technically inclined, Time Ser-
ies Matrix Objectification (TSMO) provides one exam-
ple of a radically new approach being developed. TSMO
is a new hybrid signal processing technology capable of
organizing and detecting patterns within large groupings
of clinical parameters. Using this new technology, varia-
tions in these parameters (trends, perturbations, etc.)
along parallel time-series (waveforms) are each con-
verted into sequential and overlapping time domain
objects of ascending complexity in a relational and
inheritance based hierarchy. In this way, simple objects
(such as a rise in white blood cell count) can be com-
bined with other parallel objects (such as a relational
rise in respiration rate, fall in platelet count, rise in
pulse rate, fall in bicarbonate, rise in anion gap, etc.) to
produce a complex and progressively enlarging two
dimensional complex object or image comprised of
smaller objects across the parallel waveforms of many
parameters. The complex objects over the entire evolu-
tion of a sepsis cascade, for example, may be comprised
of a very large and a progressively growing number of
objects. Complex objects are assembled along a range of
visual time scales and inherit all of the smaller objects
from which they are derived, and can therefore be
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touch screen interaction to provide complete real-time
transparency. Using this technology, the pattern of
undetected sepsis (a Type I PUHD), for example, begins
with a focal rise or fall in white blood cell count or
some other inflammatory marker, and then progresses
over hours to days to involve increasing numbers of par-
allel parameters expanding over time. As shown in
figure 7, this appears like a funnel cloud along the
timed relational matrix of parallel patient parameters
until final collapse occurs. Given the complexity of this
Type I pattern, the futility of the application of data
fragments such as any single threshold becomes clearly
evident.
When objectified by the processor, these parallel
object streams constructed from parallel clinical objects
are now in a format searchable by an object search
engine. Since clinical failures generally occur by specific
mechanisms and/or along failure cascades, they will be
comprised of object cascades across the objectified
matrix producing definable complex objects (images),
such as the complex cascade object of sepsis. The search
engine can be programmed to automatically search the
EMR and monitor data for these complex cascades at
preselected intervals. In this way, rather than relying on
traditional monitors in isolation, the entire EMR, includ-
ing the relational outputs of the traditional monitors
(if applied) are combined to produce a matrix of simple
objects, and these simple objects are combined and
searched to detect the more complex objects (images)
which indicate the presence of a patho-physiologic
cascade, e.g. PUHD I, II, and III.
Regardless the approach, and there are many alterna-
tives, the broad goal [98] is to provide a highly sensitive
and specific method of comprehensive data stream ana-
lysis with computational transparency so the healthcare
workers can see the patterns when they’ve been detected
and tracked. Presently there remains a strong residual
focus on thresholds [2]. However, this is now changing
rapidly and once our collective attention turns to PUHD
detection, many alternative approaches will likely be
developed. One of the purposes of this review is to
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Figure 7 Time Matrix of Relational Perturbations of Septic Shock.
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Page 21 of 24encourage this development and the study of all new
technologies with potential for detecting and tracking
death patterns early.
Conclusion
Some of you may still be puzzled by why patient moni-
tors used in hospitals today have remained incapable of
detecting and tracking the three common patterns
of unexpected hospital death. We agree that this lack of
progress in patient monitoring over the past decade is
very difficult to explain, given our rapid advancements
in other arguably less important technologies. For exam-
ple, each year a new generation of smart phone is
released, and it seems ironic that a patient can be dying
of undetected sepsis while connected to a 21
st century
monitor incapable of recognizing it early, while at the
same time having a mobile phone in his pocket able to
detect a song and its artist just by listening to it. The
best explanation for the persistent and constrained focus
of industry experts on our traditional monitoring tech-
nologies that would include our relentless searching for
more “optimal” thresholds [2] is explained by the diffi-
culty engaged by any science caught in its own expert
paradigm.
Scientists despite their intellect, have a common
human flaw which makes their behavior seem, at
times, foolish. This flaw comprises a human trait to
think as a herd, holding to common dogma, and
rejecting opposing science, long after the dogma has
reached the point of silliness to outsiders looking in.
But there is good news. Since no professor wants to be
caught clinging to old discredited science, when the
dogma finally begins to break, this triggers a rapid
abandonment of the old concepts and produces dra-
matic new directions of the science which often pro-
duces revolutionary benefits [98].
This year the FDA standards committee (ASTM) for
pulse oximetry began to consider establishing minimum
standards which would require that patient monitors
marketed for use on the hospital general floor are cap-
able of detecting and identifying at least the three com-
mon patterns of unexpected hospital death by 2014.
However there remains no consensus and many com-
mittee members still advocate a continued search for
the optimal alarm threshold. The standards (ASTM)
group is open for membership (or input) to interested
clinicians, patient safety advocates and researchers.
We began our discussion by taking a contrary posi-
tion to what we identified as being conventional wis-
dom, thereafter exploring in detail three very distinct
and irreducible pattern architectures associated (but
not generally well understood) with unexpected clinical
instabilities found in the general care environments of
our hospitals. We explored as well the detection
inadequacies of monitors currently available to us, and
their impact on all patients forced to trust our opi-
nions regarding their safety. We then called a question
for your consideration, framed as follows: every com-
petent clinician appreciates the lethality of sepsis and
the importance of early detection for successful resus-
citation...so how and why can it be argued reasonably,
our setting threshold alarms for this disease at limits
that would purposefully delay its detection?
We hope, now that you’ve taken the time to read this
document and perhaps have supplemented your reading
with our extensive references, that you’ll agree there
isn’t an acceptable answer to the question above. Many
of our routine practices are little more than culturally
tenured, suboptimal approaches taken for granted for
far too long. We’re all fundamentally committed to
excellence and have the talent to deliver it, but the
forces we’v ea l l o w e dt os h a p et h ei n f r a s t r u c t u r eo fo u r
professional lives are far more potent and pervasive than
any of us can easily perceive. Add in our manic work-
loads and information inundation, and we all become
pawns in a much grander scheme of healthcare medioc-
rity. We, your authors, like most healthcare workers,
love complex information in our hectic clinical worlds
to be “dumbed down” into appropriately understandable
and reliable bits and bites...but we also recognize that
the paradigm in which we now operate has gone too far
with these reductionist processes. We’re mired in a
swamp of obsolete ideology and archaic tradition. It’s
continuing to cost lives needlessly and we need to be
courageous enough to stand together and say it’st i m e
for change...it’s the only way we can ever hope to help
the millions of patients relying on us, our hospitals, and
our monitors to keep them safe.
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